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Abstract Agricultural conservation easements have positive externalities but few
studies examine the supply-side. This paper explores whether easements may also
overcome a credit-market failure, as banks may not be lending based on the full de-
veloped value of land. Original survey data test our research hypotheses and show
profitable owners and nonoperators to be using easement payments to extract cap-
ital from their land by using the preservation programs as a bank. The results also
show that the unprofitable owners and operators are reinvesting in their agricul-
tural enterprises. Both results are consistent with an underlying credit-market
failure, and the latter suggests that easements may provide indirect efficiency en-
hancement. The results suggest an integration of policies on agricultural finance
and land preservation might lead to improved efficiency.
Key words: Farmland preservation, Credit-market failure, Agricultural
land use policy.
JEL codes: Q1, Q24.
Introduction
Conservation easement (CE) programs are the highest-profile technique
in farmland preservation. At the state level alone, CE programs in the
United States spent $3.6 billion to preserve 2.37 million acres of agricultural
land (American Farmland Trust 2014) with the largest impact coming in the
Mid-Atlantic, a region where development outbids agriculture. Gardner
(1977) finds that preservation may enhance efficiency by correcting a market
VC The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural and Applied
Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:
journals.permissions@oup.com
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failure whereby agricultural land often produces positive externalities such
as protection of groundwater, wildlife habitat, natural places, and scenic
quality (Kline and Wichelns 1996). Economists investigate CE-program im-
pacts, typically with hedonic analyses of capitalized easement values with
selection effects (Nickerson and Lynch 2001; Lynch, Gray, and Geoghegan
2007; Liu and Lynch 2011; Schilling, Sullivan, and Duke 2013; Lawley and
Towe 2014). Other studies explain CE participation (Lynch and Lovell 2003;
Duke 2004), adverse selection, and cost effectiveness (Arnold, Duke, and
Messer 2013; Lynch, Gray, and Geoghegan 2010; Horowitz, Lynch, and
Stocking 2009), program efficiency (Lynch and Musser 2001), and nonmar-
ket amenity valuation (Bergstrom and Ready 2009; Duke 2008).
Collectively, economic studies on CEs offer three main results. First, land-
owners are savvy when selling CEs, namely by exploiting information
asymmetries to capture rents; this suggests that programs are not cost effect-
ive because they do not procure CEs at the least cost. Second, cost ineffect-
iveness also arises because land markets value CEs below the appraisals
that determine CE payments. However, these sources of cost ineffectiveness
do not necessarily imply overall program inefficiency, on the margin, be-
cause nonmarket valuation studies show that under most circumstances CE
payments (though cost-ineffectively high) remain well below the external
benefits. Evidence thus shows that CEs are efficient on the margin, but stud-
ies also identify ways to enhance program cost effectiveness. This paper ex-
plores whether CE programs might have additional, indirect efficiency
impacts beyond positive externalities—specifically by providing some
credit-constrained farm owners with access to capital.1
We develop hypotheses and assess original data related to potential
efficiency-relevant indirect effects triggered by overcoming illiquidity
through infusing capital (CE payments) into the agricultural economy. This
is exploratory research, so rather than offer the definitive explanation of the
link between credit and CE, we offer a theory and test whether the evidence
is consistent with the theory.2 The empirical evidence presented is consistent
with a theory in which some owners are credit-constrained and find that
participating in CE programs is one way to improve liquidity. Briggeman,
Towe, and Morehart (2009) define credit constraints as imperfections in cap-
ital markets such that some borrowers cannot access capital at the current
interest rate, can access less than they would optimally choose (credit ration-
ing), or do not even apply for credit because they anticipate denial. Credit
constraints perpetuate a liquidity problem and reduce farm production and
profitability (Pederson, Chung, and Nel 2012).
The theoretical framework investigates the indirect effects of CE pay-
ments on liquidity and develops hypotheses about whether CE payments
1Few studies consider efficiency-relevant impacts of the inputs and outputs of the CE policy process.
Most CE studies examine three overlapping markets: (1) governments demanding CE in the easement
market; (2) farmers demanding land from farm owners in the restricted land market; and (3) farmers and
developers demanding land from farm owners in the unrestricted land market. This paper considers a po-
tential output of the financial transaction that is the CE purchase.
2To our knowledge, this is the first work that posits a possible link between CE programs and access to
credit. Our contribution is to test whether the evidence is consistent with a theory in which credit-
constrained farm owners are systematically participating in CE programs. In this way, it is similar to
other studies that pose novel hypotheses rather than offer definitive causal relationships. One similar
study is Brorsen, Doye, and Neal (2015), who offer evidence consistent with one possible explanation to
the small farm size puzzle, that is, why are large farms sold given that small farms have higher per acre
values? In effect, the theory and evidence in support of the hypothesis is the contribution.
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could be liquid capital exchanged for landed capital. Assuming credit con-
straints, do the data contradict a theory in which owners use CE payments to
enhance their operations’ viability? The tested hypotheses suggest that farm
credit markets could potentially be imperfect, and that potentially some cost-
liness, stickiness, or lumpiness exists so that some owners cannot access all
their land capital—especially development-based equity. This in turn sug-
gests that, if CE programs provide a mechanism to access this capital and the
literature cited below shows that agriculture can be credit constrained, then
CEs can potentially affect farmer profitability. Principally, CEs can affect the
efficiency of the farm economy by enhancing some farmers’ ability to re-
invest, adopt new technologies, and thereby adjust their operations.
Efficiency-relevant implications are also developed with respect to how CE
payments are used and by whom. In sum, this paper offers evidence suggest-
ing that CE programs may correct a credit-market failure facing some farm-
ers. This indirectly helps agriculture compete with developed uses while
supplying well-recognized positive externalities in urbanizing regions.
Methods and Data
This section conceptualizes the direct and indirect efficiency implications
of CEs and then reviews existing survey evidence. An original data set is
described with the related exploratory hypotheses that test for CE impacts
on illiquidity and how CE payments are used.
Theoretical Motivation
Many observers likely perceive questions of CE efficiency to be straight-
forward, that is, CEs are tax/subsidy policies that correct market price.
However, Duke and Lynch (2006) argue that the underlying property rights
relationships instead frame CEs as a participatory land market intervention;
CE programs buy easements in a market for lesser rights in land, which
then remove that land from the unrestricted market. Without the misleading
tax-based rationale, CE programs do not “correct” market prices but instead
redirect public funds, raising demand for easements in the unrestricted mar-
ket. In turn, CEs adjust the restricted market, expanding supply and lower-
ing price. Although this argument reveals how CE programs directly benefit
farmers who seek to enter the industry or buy more land, it also suggests
that CEs are unlikely to be an optimal policy because their payments in no
way equate fiscal costs with the external benefits they seek to internalize
(Duke and Lynch 2006); CE payments might over-, under-, or perfectly in-
ternalize land market externalities.
Although CE costs and benefits are not equated on the margin, nonmarket
valuation studies suggest that CE interventions have high external benefits
and are small relative to the agricultural land market (for syntheses, see
Bergstrom and Ready 2009; Duke 2008). Therefore, on the margin, this “de-
mand-side rationale” suggests that CE efforts are likely efficiency-enhancing
because they are internalizing some positive externalities. The remainder of
this paper explores whether CE interventions may also enhance the supply
side, correcting a credit-market failure and helping agriculture compete.
Indirect effects of CE policy involve losses (such as the cost of raising and
spending CE budgets with tax system distortions), efforts that promote syn-
ergies (such as retaining an agricultural critical mass), and the internal and
Illiquid Capital: Are Conservation Easement Payments Reinvested in Farms?
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external benefits of retaining agricultural land use in an area that is becom-
ing more urbanized. Table 1 identifies and explains several supply-side, in-
direct impacts of CE on efficiency, and this subsection focuses on the credit-
market failure. Owners of unrestricted agricultural land often have great
equity in the land—that is, they are “land rich and cash poor”—a common
circumstance in regions with high development pressure raising land prices
above capitalized agricultural rents. Although farm borrowing has been
studied, it has not received attention focused on urbanizing regions.
Between 1992 and 2011, U.S. farm business debt rose 39% (Patrick and Ifft
2014). Yet farm owner leveraging declined to a rate below 10% (Goodwin
and Smith 2014) likely as a result of recently doubled farmland values
(Weber and Key 2014). In addition, Patrick and Ifft (2014) find stability in
the broad categories of debt use, where most is long-term debt to purchase
land (with the loan secured with that land) and also shorter-term debt used
to purchase inputs and equipment. These national trends do not apply well
in urbanizing areas, where equity is based largely on development land
value. Although Weber and Key (2014) found national evidence that owners
bought more land if they had larger appreciation gains, it is unclear if this
effect carries over to development-based appreciation rather than agricul-
tural profits appreciation.3 Our approach differs in studying farmland ap-
preciation due to urbanizing pressure and focuses on states with this
pressure, while Weber and Key (2014) examined larger states with less ur-
banization pressure.
Mishra, Moss, and Erickson (2008) find that farm debt affects farmland
values, supporting their argument that agricultural assets differ from many
other financial assets. Mishra, Moss, and Erickson (2008) then argue that ar-
bitrage assumptions about trading off debt and equity in a perfectly func-
tioning financial market do not hold in the farm sector. In addition,
empirical studies reveal credit constraints. Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart
(2009) found that 53.7% of farm sole-proprietorships freely receive credit but
that credit challenges or constraints exist in a smaller subset (10.5%), and the
remainder did not apply for credit (35.7%). These authors conclude that
credit constraints lower the overall value of production by 3%. Pederson,
Chung, and Nel (2012) found liquidity constraints among some farmer
types. In their study, a 1% increase in access to credit increased income by
0.49% and investment in depreciable assets by 0.33%. Other studies have
found evidence of farm credit constraints, though the evidence is more sug-
gestive because of unobservability and endogeneity complications (Lambert
and Bayda 2005).4 Evidence shows that new farmers, even when operating
relatively efficiently, are more likely to face credit constraints, though there
is mixed evidence about whether these constraints rise during economic
downturns (Bierlen and Featherstone 1998; Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2012).
Among many impacts, credit constraints limit technology adoption and
productivity (Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart 2009). Thus, existing studies
show that credit constraints exist for some farmers and this affects their
3A referee suggests that increasing profitability-based lending since the 1980s, as opposed to collateral-
based lending, may help explain why lenders do not recognize development-based equity.
4Lambert and Bayda (2005, p. 288) find that: “The positive relationship between the intermediate debt-
to-asset ratio and technical efficiency supports both the credit-evaluation theory and liquidity preference.
Lenders are presumed to finance more-efficient farmers having a high probability of repayment.” This in
turn suggests that farms on the margin of profitability may be facing credit constraints.
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profitability and productivity. Our paper will extend this line of research to
focus on farmers’ abilities to access development-based equity.
If banks will not lend to farmers based on development-based equity be-
cause they view this value as a poor risk of collateral, then a credit market
failure might exist. Any credit-market correction would be an indirect effi-
ciency enhancement—in effect, CE programs infuse agriculture with the
very capital that arises from development pressure. The credit-market fail-
ure prevents farmers from optimizing; for instance, they cannot fully re-
invest in their operations and thus cannot compete fully with development.
If credit were constrained, unrestricted land would have a lower value in
agricultural use (capitalized agricultural rents) than when no credit-market
failure existed, which inefficiently increases the relative value of selling for
development for some farmers on the margin. Similarly, if CEs increase
farm profitability among easement sellers because they overcome illiquidity,
then capitalized farm profits increase agricultural land values—albeit in the
restricted market. CEs thus might facilitate preservation from within, as
agriculture increases its relative competition for land. In addition, it is well
known that CEs preserve farmland but not necessarily working farms. If CE
payments allowed optimal reinvestment, they would encourage working
farms. It is the working-farm aspect that delivers many of the aforemen-
tioned positive externalities (Duke and Aull-Hyde 2002).
Two possibilities exist regarding how capital markets function with re-
spect to this development-based equity, and the functioning may be differ-
ent for different farmers. Capital markets may function well, and
landowners can borrow with low cost against all their equity or reduce the
cost of borrowing a smaller stake. Or CEs may simply provide access to cap-
ital without the cost of borrowing—of course, assuming away transaction
costs in entering a CE program and carrying some assumptions about a
landowner’s view of the value of different investments over time.
Our exploratory hypotheses arise from a competing theory: owners may
not be able to access development-increment capital because there may be a
credit constraint in areas with development pressure. It would be those
farms on the margin of profitability that would be most sensitive to credit
constraints, where small changes in access to credit may determine the fu-
ture development or farm outcome. According to this second theory, CEs
may collateralize capital for farm owners by enabling them to bypass an im-
perfect credit market. This theory implies two inefficiencies. It has a credit-
market failure and suggests society may lose the external benefits of having
farms if farmers need to exit agriculture to access all their equity. An add-
itional inefficiency of this second narrative has to do with the fate of preser-
vation dollars. If CE payments leak outside the agricultural sector, then the
payments are transfers from taxpayers to farm owners who happen to bene-
fit from development-pressure appreciation. If instead CE payments are
recycled back into agriculture through operational reinvestment, then the
taxpayer expenditures help ensure that agriculture land use persists.
Investments made in fixtures (such a buildings) raise the value of land,
while investments in mobile capital (equipment) raise the value of farming
to the owner and land values if the equipment carries through to subsequent
owners. Investments made in achieving an optimal scale or size of an oper-
ation would similarly raise agricultural use returns and land values. If so,
agriculture would be more competitive, and positive externalities are more
likely to persist. The specific hypotheses tested will show that both
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy
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profitable owners and non-operators seem to be extracting capital—
suggesting no indirect efficiency of CE programs—while the unprofitable
owners and operators are reinvesting—suggesting indirect efficiency.
Prior Empirical Results on CE Payment Use
Survey data suggest considerable heterogeneity among owners in the use
of CE payments. These data come from: 1) Duke and Ilvento (2004), who
surveyed all preserved owners in Delaware; 2) Clark (2010), who surveyed
similar owners in Ohio; 3) Esseks, Nelson, and Stroe (2006), who surveyed
422 owners in many states that had their CE paid from the federal
matching-grant Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program (FRPP); 4)
Esseks and Schilling (2013), who surveyed 506 owners from the same popu-
lation; and 5) Lynch (2007), who surveyed both preserved and nonpreserved
farmland owners in Maryland. The three state surveys found evidence that
preserved farmers differ from other farmers in terms of ownership; gener-
ally owners of preserved farms tend to have larger farms and be active
owner-operators. Lynch and Lovell (2003) found growing crops, owning
more acres, earning a high percentage of family income from farming, and
having a child who plans to continue farming increased enrollment in pres-
ervation. The motivation for selling CEs revealed a difference between own-
ers shoring up the financial viability of their operation and others who seem
to be on firmer financial footing, which helps motivate the profitability
hypotheses. For instance, in Delaware 44% reported considering relief from
the pressure of debt, and 38% considered reinvesting in the operation when
deciding to sell CEs; that said, 65% ended up reinvesting CE payments
(Duke and Ilvento 2004). Ohio was similar, where Clark (2010) found that
25% sought to “generate income” and 11% wanted to purchase more land.
Duke and Ilvento (2004) also found that half the owners (51%) said the pres-
ervation program “provided critical funding to improve the financial viabil-
ity of my operation,” while the other half (49%) disagreed. In Maryland,
Lynch (2007) found 42% enrolled for money to reinvest in their farm
operation.
The surveys reveal how CE payments were used. Some owners used pay-
ments in ways that did not reinvest in the farm economy—termed “personal
needs”. In Delaware, 54% reported savings and investments, 4% reported
educational purposes, and 1% reported a non-farm business. In Ohio, Clark
(2010) found that about 1% of CE payments went to education and travel,
20% to general savings (including trusts and retirement funds).5 Esseks,
Nelson, and Stroe (2006) and Esseks and Schilling (2013) report 52% and
69%, respectively, spent some CE payments on personal needs. Similarly,
Lynch (2007) found that farmers saved (28%), financed retirement (12%),
used for family needs (8%), and remodeled their homes (11%).
In contrast, many reported that they used some CE payments for reinvest-
ing in agriculture. Esseks and Schilling (2013) found 84% of FRPP partici-
pants allocated some of the payments to agricultural purposes. Duke and
Ilvento (2004) found that Delaware farmers decreased mortgage debt (33%),
decreased operational loan debt (19%), and purchased another farm parcel
(15%) or farm equipment (15%). In Ohio, 16% of CE payments went to
5Clark found that 35% of CE payments went to debts or taxes, but it is unclear whether this is reinvest-
ment. Also, many use payments to establish conservation practices, but it is unclear whether this in-
creases farm profitability.
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buying more land, 15% to buildings and equipment, and 4% to farm ex-
penses (Clark 2010). Also in Ohio, owners reported plans to diversify (27%)
or establish new farm practices (34%) in the future (Clark 2010). Esseks,
Nelson, and Stroe (2006) found that 55% reduced mortgage debt and 58%
improved the farm operation (equipment, buildings, land, etc.). Esseks and
Schilling (2013) reported that 48% reinvested some money into buildings
and structures, 37% repaid loans on agricultural land, 28% bought equip-
ment, and 18% bought more land. Lynch (2007) found that Maryland farm-
ers used CE payments to reduce debt (35%), finance their farming
operations (18%), buy more land (11%), and purchase equipment (8%).
Lynch (2007) also found that preserved farm owners differed from nonpre-
served farm owners in their investment patterns; preserved farm owners
were more likely to reinvest (66%) than nonpreserved farm owners (55%).
Preserved farm owners were also more likely to invest in human capital by
attending workshops to learn new technologies and enhance their farming
skills (60%) compared to nonpreserved farm owners (38%).
In sum, although some farmers use CE payments for personal needs,
many are reinvesting—either to improve the profitability or financial health
of the farm operation. These data are consistent with the narrative that, for
some farmers, lending-market opportunities may be inadequate. Yet these
studies do not reveal ownership or profitability patterns, which might fur-
ther support this narrative and thereby provide evidence that CEs are sav-
ing some farms that would otherwise exit. Still, some owners likely perceive
CE payments to be just another form of liquid capital, and in this case CEs
may not provide indirect efficiency. These two purposes are operationalized
as extracting capital hypotheses versus reinvestment hypotheses.6
Sampling and Data
A random sample, by state, was drawn from the entire population of
owners of farmland preserved through state-level CE programs in
Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey. Owners with multiple properties ap-
pear once. Sampling was proportionate to the population in each program
and was drawn from 5,319 owners of farmland preserved through the fol-
lowing organizations: Delaware Agricultural Land Preservation
Foundation; Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation;
Maryland Environmental Trust; Maryland Rural Legacy Program; and New
Jersey Farmland Preservation Program. There were 507 completed phone
interviews, averaging 31.7minutes, and a response rate of 53.8%. Schilling
et al. (2015) provide further details on the sample and specify the ways in
which the sample closely matches the population.
Not all of the 507 surveyed owners of restricted farmland received CE
payments. Termed “first-generation” owners, one sub-sample is 346 owners
(68%) who made the decision to preserve—323 received CE payments and
23 donated easements. Another 113 were exclusively “second-generation”
in that they owned preserved land but did not make the decision to preserve
6A qualification is that some farmers might extract capital and this still promotes indirect efficiency. If
one extracts capital for retirement, then the farm is not sold to finance retirement. This in turn may allow
an heir to farm or another farmer to buy it. So indirect efficiency could come from both making the farm
more profitable and from preventing the sale for personal needs. However, the data cannot isolate these
final purposes associated with extracting capital, so the study’s framing is more conservative.
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it and therefore received no CE payments—that is, they bought restricted
land or inherited it. Two owners were excluded because of missing informa-
tion. A surprisingly high number of owners (n¼ 46) satisfied the definition of
both first- and second-generation owner. The analyses start with the 346 first-
generation farmers and then explore a combined sample that also includes
the 113 second-generation owners. However, the final dataset is smaller
(n¼ 424) in the regressions because some first- and second-generation owners
had missing data on key investment or owner-type variables.
Hypotheses and Variables
It is very difficult to observe directly if owners used CE payments to ex-
tract capital or reinvest for several reasons: 1) CE payments and owners’
existing liquid capital are fungible; 2) information asymmetry prevents the
researcher from observing directly an owner’s private costs and how they
affect decision making; and 3) challenges exist in modeling the complex
interactions of the agricultural economy, land market, and other markets.
Unobservability thus requires a theoretical framework, informed by prior
findings, that motivates behavioral differences in the use of CE payments
and then uses statistical inference to examine original survey data for sys-
tematic behavioral patterns. In other words, we test whether the data reject
the exploratory hypotheses about capital extraction and reinvestment and, if
so, with respect to what behavioral drivers or purposes for which respond-
ents reported using the CE payments. If evidence cannot reject the explora-
tory hypothesis, then it warrants future work directed towards overcoming
unobservability.
The variables in table 2 measure nine purposes for CE payments as
derived from ten survey questions. Each variable is dichotomous, and re-
spondents could dedicate CE payments to multiple categories. When re-
spondents allocate to Personal uses, it best accords with a narrative in which
owners are using CE to extract capital because, in effect, they are treating
the program as an equity loan (but one that is not repaid). In contrast, the
other eight purposes are more consistent with the narrative of reinvesting in
the agricultural operation. Although a single owner’s payments could go to-
wards both personal uses and reinvestments, regressions test for systematic
patterns holding all else equal. Explanatory variables explain part of the de-
cision to allocate funds to a purpose, including Heir-relative (a relative is ex-
pected to take over the farm), Heir-nonrelative, No-succession-plan, Direct-
Marketing, Acres-preserved, and Age. In addition, Profitable collapses two
measures of profitability into a single indicator: 1) the 32% of farm operators
who reported their operation was profitable (specifically, it is an opinion
measure about whether operational revenues covered the costs); and 2) the
nonoperator owners who believe land costs were covered by rent.7
Combined, 50% (n¼ 255) reported profitability.
The main hypotheses are collected in table 3, and multivariate probit
models of the various purposes are used to test for patterns in the use of CE
7After 11 questions about the different types of revenue on preserved land, respondents were asked: “Do
you think that the total revenues covered the total costs in 2010 of farming (or of owning) your preserved
land?” The question focuses on 2010 for concreteness, though it does necessitate qualifications about the
measure not necessarily reflecting other years. All but 11 respondents had owned preserved land prior to
2010.
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payments. The first set involves farm profitability. Owners of profitable
farms should tend to use CE payments for personal needs, that is, capital ex-
traction because such owners would not need CE payments (and the accom-
panying restrictions) to reinvest in their already-profitable operation.
Similarly, unprofitable farm owners should be more likely than profitable
ones to dedicate CE payments to agricultural purposes because they are less
likely to be able to bolster their operations using credit markets. In other
words, there would tend to be no capital-market failure with the profitable
farms because: 1) they already have the needed funds to reinvest; 2) they
made the reinvestments in the past, which is why they are now profitable;
and/or 3) banks are more likely to be willing to make loans secured by their
profitable operations. Other variables should be related to this hypothesis,
so the regression controls for larger operations (with Acres-preserved) and
higher-sales farms.
A second set of hypotheses involves the ownership structure of the pre-
served farms. Owner-lifestyle and Owner-nonoperator tend to indicate less dir-
ect involvement in farming. But Owner-lifestyle still is classified as an
operator. This contrasts with Owner-low-sales and Owner-high-sales, whose
primary occupation is farming.8 The second set of hypotheses is that high-
Table 2 Survey Questions on the Purposes for which Conservation Easement
Payments Were Used
Variable Survey Questions
Personal Q60: “Have you spent any of the development rights payments on
meeting personal or household needs such as for education, health,
fixing up your residence, or investing in stocks or other securities?”
Ag-land Q62: “Any spent on purchasing additional farmland in STATE?”
Q63: “Any spent on purchasing farmland in another state?”
EstatePlan Q68: “Were any of the payments from the sale of development rights
used or set aside for transferring ownership of the preserved land to
relatives or other persons?”
Debt Q61: “Were any of the proceeds from selling development rights spent
for decreasing debt on farmland you already owned in STATE?”
Ag-financial Q67: “Any proceeds used for starting or expanding an agriculturally
related business on your farmland in STATE?”
Irrigation Q66: “Any used for constructing or improving irrigation facilities on
your farmland in STATE?”
Equipment Q64: “Any proceeds from the sale of development rights applied to
purchasing machinery or equipment to be used on your farmland-
preserved or unpreserved in STATE?”
Buildings Q65: “Any proceeds applied to constructing of renovating buildings
or other structures for agricultural purposes on your farmland in
STATE?”
Other Q69: “Any payments from the sale of development rights used for
purposes that we’ve not already covered?”
8Nonoperators own preserved land but are not, as the survey was worded, “The operator of any farmland
in STATE in the sense that you made the day-to-day decisions about such things as planting, harvesting,
feeding livestock, and marketing.” High sales indicates operators with “total cash receipts from your
farm operation” over $250,000 in 2010. Low sales were receipt up to $250,000, but primary occupation
was nevertheless “farm operator”. Lifestyle farmers were those with receipts up to $250,000, but their
primary occupation was an occupation other than farm operator or retired.
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and low-sales owners should be more likely than lifestyle farmers to re-
invest and that lifestyle farmers should be more likely than nonoperators to
reinvest. The rationale behind the second set of hypotheses is that nonopera-
tors and to a lesser extent lifestyle farmers are not actively involved in the
agriculture operations; and one expects that they are more likely to be opti-
mizing with respect to nonpecuniary values than full-time farmers. If they
preserve their farms, they are more likely to be extracting capital but not
likely to be reinvesting in their operations. All else being equal, the use of
CEs to secure capital for reinvestment suggests a credit-market failure, and
the regression examines how different ownership patterns affect reinvest-
ment choices.
The third set of hypotheses compares the tendencies among respondents
to: 1) dedicate CE payments to three types of reinvestments; and 2) make
any investments from all sources of capital in the same three types at any
time “since preservation.” Because farmers frequently make reinvestments
(in these models, irrigation, equipment, and buildings) and because money
is fungible, one cannot definitively know that the CE payments compelled
the reinvestments as opposed to investments that would probably have
occurred about the same time. In our data, unobservability has no statistical
solution. Nevertheless, regression can be used to examine investment pat-
terns, all else being equal. Data were collected on 1) whether first-generation
owners put CE payments to the three reinvestments; and 2) whether all
first-generation and second-generation owners had made reinvestments in
those categories at any time since purchase/inheritance, or preservation. In
other words, data were collected on reinvestment using CE payments (first-
generation) and any other money since preservation (first- and second-
generation). These data show substantial variation.9 Because the effect of
being second-generation can be controlled in the “since preservation” re-
gressions, the coefficients reveal investment patterns among first-generation
owners with CE payments and since preservation. Although the coefficient
estimates cannot be compared across models because the dependent vari-
ables refer to different questions, the models can examine differential re-
investment tendencies (statistical significance and sign), all else being equal.
Results and Discussion
The results support the hypotheses that owners with some characteristics
(i.e., profitable, nonoperators) are more likely to report using CE payments
for personal needs than owners with other characteristics (i.e., not profitable,
operators), who tend to reinvest. The case is built using descriptive statistics,
explanatory models of the uses of CE payments, and a comparison of re-
investment behavior by first-generation owners using CE payments to those
who were first-generation but donated easements, and those who were
9Consider investment in irrigation. Second-generation owners only had the opportunity to invest “since
preservation” because they received no CE payments, and 20 invested in irrigation and 84 did not.
However, first-generation owners had the ability to invest using CE, non-CE funds, or both sources, and
276 did not invest in irrigation. Of the 71 who did invest, 30 reported using CE payments and investing
“since preservation”—it is unknown if the 30 contributed additional money to the CE payments. The ap-
proach provides insight, however, because 41 first-generation owners reported investing in irrigation
“since preservation” but not with CE payments. In sum, respondents are reporting data that reveal dis-
tinct sources and, coupled with first- and second-generation controls, can be used in a regression to de-
scribe investment tendencies in observable and reported variables.
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second-generation. Collectively, the evidence supports the theory that CE
payments can have an indirect efficiency effect, overcoming the illiquidity of
land appreciation and a related credit-market failure for some farm owners.
How First-generation Owners Spent CE Payments
The descriptive results (based on the final regression sample) show that
the most commonly reported purpose (64%) was Personal, which was similar
to the 54% in Duke and Ilvento (2004) and 59% in Lynch (2007). Among the
reinvestment categories, five exceeded 10%: Equipment (40%); Debt (36%);
Ag-financial (48%); Buildings (36%); and Ag-Land (20% with 17% in state and
3% out of state). Although asked in slightly different ways from prior sur-
veys, the results generally match those from the Delaware, Maryland, and
Ohio surveys. For instance, in Delaware 33% and in Maryland 35%
decreased mortgage debt. The 20% buying land accords with Delaware
(15%), Maryland (11%), and Ohio (16%) (Duke and Ilvento 2004; Clark 2010;
Lynch 2007). The biggest difference is with Buildings and Equipment. The
rate for equipment in Delaware (15%) and Maryland (8%) and for buildings
and equipment in Ohio (15%) are lower than that reported in this survey
(Duke and Ilvento 2004; Clark 2010; Lynch 2007). The survey results reveal
relatively low rates for Irrigation (10%), Estate (9%), and Other (8%).
The Relationship between Profitability and Owner-type
In the regression sample, 161 of 346 (47%) first-generation owners were
profitable. This differs statistically from the profitability of second-
generation farms, which is 65% (72 of 113). Although there is no definitive
evidence as to why, it might be that an owner buying or inheriting restricted
land tends to be profitable. It may also be a direct result from saving money
on land costs. By inheriting or buying lower cost-restricted land, farmers
may be able to direct more investment into the operation.
Table 4 shows that among first- and second-generation owners, high-sales
farms were by far the most likely to be profitable—only eight were unprofit-
able (12.5%). Low-sales farms were also likely to be profitable, but only 43%
of lifestyle farms (which may not be farmed with a profit motive) and non-
operators were profitable, which may suggest low rents or high land costs.
A Chi-square test shows that high-sales farms were statistically more likely
to be profitable. Sales and profitability vary together, but the regression iso-
lates the effects of each on multiple purposes of spending CE payments.
Explanatory Model of CE Payments Spent by First-generation Owners
Regressions test for patterns in the extraction of capital (Personal) and re-
investment categories (the eight ag-related purposes). Each purpose formed
one dichotomous dependent variable, and the same independent variables
explain all purposes. Table 5 reports a multivariate probit regression for the
main eight purposes among first-generation owners; a multivariate probit
including the Other purpose failed to converge and so this regression is re-
ported as a univariate logit.10 Although the number of coefficients where
10Prior analysis examined a series of univariate logit models that each individually explained between
10% and 27% of the variation observed in the dependent variables. The multivariate specification is
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the null hypothesis is rejected is modest, this does not necessarily mean the
explanatory power of the model is low; a higher power is not necessarily
anticipated because—beyond the hypothesized drivers—it is possible that
solely idiosyncratic forces within the farmers’ minds determine these alloca-
tion decisions. If CE payments and bank loans were interchangeable, then
there should be no credit-market failure and no patterns in the drivers of the
purposes in the use of CE payments. Therefore, any statistical significance
indicates some explained deviation from a purely idiosyncratic pattern. This
is the essence of the exploratory hypotheses, and the fact that some signifi-
cance was observed suggests that the capital extraction and reinvestment
theories cannot be rejected. Most of the significant drivers relate to the
hypothesized effects.
The regressions show that profitable farms are more likely to use CE pay-
ments for personal reasons (an increase at 2% significance level), supporting
the hypothesis that profitable farmers extract capital. Among these first-
generation farms, profitable and unprofitable farm owners were equally
likely to reinvest in land, estate planning, debt, agricultural financial, irriga-
tion, buildings, and other agricultural purposes. The ownership results also
reveal systematic patterns. Compared to nonoperators, owners of high-sales
farms are much less likely to use CE payments for personal needs (a de-
crease at 1% significance level) and more likely to use the money for five re-
investments: debt; agricultural financial; irrigation; equipment; and
agricultural-other. For high-sales farms, strong support exists for the re-
investment hypothesis and evidence against the extraction of capital.
No evidence was found that the other two owner types (owner-lifestyle
and owner-low sales) are more or less likely than nonoperators to target per-
sonal needs. Moreover, there are many coefficients that suggest that relative
to nonoperators, all operator types have an increased likelihood of targeting
several reinvestment categories.11 Evidence suggests that owners of low-
sales farms are more likely than nonoperators to reinvest in five purposes:
debt; agricultural financial; irrigation; equipment; and buildings. Even life-
style farmers are more likely than nonoperators to reinvest in three pur-
poses: agricultural financial; equipment; and agricultural-other.
Collectively, this suggests that operators are more likely than nonoperators
to reinvest CE payments, and this supports the reinvestment hypothesis.
Table 4 Survey Results on Profitability by Owner-type
Profitable Not Profitable Total
Owner-nonoperator 86 (41.5%) 121 (58.5%) 207
Owner-lifestyle 50 (42.7%) 67 (57.3%) 117
Owner-low-sales 51 (58.6%) 36 (41.4%) 87
Owner-high-sales 56 (87.5%) 8 (12.5%) 64
Total 243 (48.8%) 232 (51.2%) 475
Note: Includes first- and second-generation owners.
superior because the unexplained variation between any two models is correlated in many instances (see
the statistical evidence in the 28 rhos). Thus, the univariate models would be biased, and 9 of 32 coeffi-
cients changed in significance between the estimations. The simulated maximum likelihood method used
is available in Stata and was developed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003).
11This corresponds with Esseks and Schilling (2013), who found that although 84% reported some re-
investment, the rate was 91% among operators and only 68% among nonoperators.
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Although not central to the key hypotheses, evidence emerged that other
characteristics have systematic effects. For instance, direct-marketers are less
likely than those who do not direct market to extract capital, as are those
who owned their land longer. Also, owners living on their farms are more
likely to reinvest in equipment. Farmers who owned their land longer are
less likely to use CE payments for personal needs and equipment. These re-
sults are not inconsistent with the key hypotheses. In contrast, it was un-
anticipated that those with a relative who would inherit the farm showed
no greater likelihood to extract capital (i.e., split the value of the estate with
relatives); this group, however, was more likely to invest in irrigation. There
was also some evidence that older farmers are less likely to reinvest in three
purposes: agricultural land; debt; and agricultural financial.
Collectively, the evidence supports the reinvestment theory for high-sales
farms and, to a lesser extent, owner-operators in general. This tendency at-
tenuates for owners of profitable farms, who tend to extract capital, all else
being equal. The characteristics of high-sales farms and owner-operators
probably are what legislators and agencies had in mind when they designed
the programs. Although it is unlikely this was considered during the design
of preservation programs, this analysis suggests that CE payments may also
be attenuating a credit-market failure. Not all participants reinvest.
Profitable and nonoperator farms appear to be extracting capital but these
farms still provide external benefits.
Farming Reinvestments: First-generation Investment Patterns
The models in table 6 compare three reinvestments using first generation
farms and their “only CE payments” (columns 1, 3, 5), and those “since pres-
ervation “(columns 2, 4, and 6) in which the first-generation sellers of ease-
ments could have used CE payments but did not necessarily do so. The three
“only CE payment” models are reproduced from table 5, while the “since
preservation” models come from a new trivariate probit estimated in Stata
using the Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) simulated maximum likelihood
method. Importantly, a prior regression of the since-preservation models
showed that the choices of second-generation farmers are not statistically dif-
ferent than those of first-generation and, further, there are no significant inter-
actions of one generation and the explanatory variables.12 It is important to
reiterate that the “since preservation” decisions are based on separate survey
questions than the “only CE payments”. All six models therefore have coeffi-
cients that reflect the reinvestment tendencies of first-generation owners, and
the results help reveal whether the CE payments are essential reinvestment
drivers or whether those investments tended to happen anyways.
The since-preservation results show that profitable farmers are more
likely than unprofitable farm owners to have invested in irrigation (positive
coefficient at the 5% level) and less likely to have invested in buildings since
the time of preservation (negative coefficient at the 5% level). However, the
corresponding CE payments models found no effects for profitability—that
is, owners of profitable and unprofitable farms are equally likely to use CE
payments for irrigation and buildings. Comparing the tendencies shows
12We attempted to perform the test using a multivariate probit model of the three investment equations;
however, the multivariate probit model failed to converge to a solution for the second-generation owners
due to the small sample size. As a result, we report results of a univariate test in the appendix.
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that, among profitable farm owners, CE payments have a greater tendency
to be used for buildings and a lower tendency to be used on irrigation than
typical operating funds. For unprofitable farm owners the tendencies are the
same, regardless of whether the money could have come from CE or not.
Asymmetric tendencies also emerge among owner types. High-sales farm-
ers are more likely than nonoperators to invest in irrigation and equipment,
regardless of whether they received money from CE payments. Moreover,
high-sales farmers tend to invest in buildings more than nonoperators do
(positive coefficient at the 1% level), again with no effect found with CE pay-
ments. On the other hand, our analysis found that high-sales farmers have a
lower tendency to invest CE money into buildings than they have for invest-
ment in buildings in general (since preservation regression). For this cat-
egory, the data suggest CE payments are not providing critical funding to
high-sales farmers, all else being equal. Asymmetric tendencies were also
Table 6 Comparison of Three Investments Purposes for Sub-sample of First-gener-
ation Owners to Full Sample of All Owners of Preserved Land
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable
Irrigation
(1st Gen.)
Invested in
Irrigation
(All Farms)
Equipment
(1st Gen.)
Invested in
Equipment
(All Farms)
Buildings
(1st Gen.)
Invested in
Buildings
(All Farms)
Intercept 22.60*** 21.98*** 0.44 0.18 0.08 0.05
Profitable 0.07 0.42*** 0.23 0.04 0.08 20.31**
Heir-relative 0.86* 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.14 20.41*
No-succession-plan 0.59 0.06 0.01 0.25 0.24 0.40
0.18 0.16 0.04
Directmkt 0.30 0.37** 0.01 0.24 0.27 0.48***
Age 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.005 0.003
Expand 0.05 0.87*** 0.36 0.11 0.16 0.66*
Liveonfarm 0.01 0.13 0.41** 0.22 0.12 0.19
Timeowned 0.02 0.002 20.02** 0.03*** 0.01 0.02***
Acrespreserved 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0001 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002
Newhouses 0.0002 0.0001 20.0004*** 0.00002 0.0001 0.0001
Owner-lifestyle 0.04 0.21 0.67*** 1.04*** 0.26 0.34**
Owner-low-sales 0.85*** 0.08 0.72*** 1.43*** 0.46** 0.60***
Owner-high-sales 1.24*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 1.14*** 0.04 0.72***
Conserve 0.26 0.13 0.08 0.36** 0.05 0.37***
rho with Equipment
(model þ2)
0.42*** 0.19**
rho with Buildings
(model þ2 and þ4)
0.38*** 0.18** 0.71*** 0.24***
Percentage reportingˆ 83/424 292/424 249/424
Note: Asterisks represent the following:*¼ 10%,**¼ 5%,***¼ 1%. Models 1, 3, and 5 from the MVP in
table 5. Models 2, 4, and 6 from a trivariate probit estimated from N¼ 430; the broader sample was
N¼ 479 but there were missing values. The trivate probit has fit statistics: Log likelihood¼-628.94025,
Wald chi2(45)¼206.52, Prob > chi2¼0.0000. Related to Models 2, 4, and 6 was 4-variate probit (with
some different variables), which was previously reported in Gottlieb et al. (2015), but the results were not
compared to the three other regressions as they were herein. Reserve categories of the indicator variables
in all models are: Owner-nonoperator, Heir-nonrelative. Starting sample includes 484, rather than
507, because 23 farmers were not involved “in agriculture”. iˆndicates that percentage reporting “yes” to
the purposes. The three regressions with 424 observations were Survey questions: Q84: What year did
you first own farmland in STATE preserved through a conservation easement?Q85: Since YEAR OF
Q84, have you purchased equipment or machinery for use on any of the preserved farmland you
own. . .?Q86: Since the year you first owned preserved farmland, have you done any construction or
renovation of buildings or other structures for agricultural purposes on your preserved land?Q87: Since
YEAR OF Q84, have you constructed or improved irrigation facilities on any of the preserved farmland
you own. . .?
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found for low-sales farms. Low-sales farms did not show a tendency to in-
vest in irrigation since preservation—it was only when the money source
could have been CE payments that low-sales farms invested. This compari-
son suggests that CE payments may provide critical funding for reinvest-
ment because they are associated with a greater tendency for low-sales
farms to install or improve irrigation.
Unsurprisingly, regardless of whether the money source is CE payments
or not, lifestyle farms and nonoperators have similar tendencies when in-
vesting in irrigation (no significant tendency) and different when investing
in equipment (lifestyle farmers are more likely to do so, at the 1% level).
However, an asymmetric pattern emerges with building investment.
Lifestyle farmers are more likely than nonoperators to invest in buildings
since preservation (positive coefficient at 5% level), but this tendency does
not hold for CE payments. Comparing the two results suggests that lifestyle
farmers have a lower tendency to use CE payments for buildings than they
would otherwise have. Asymmetric tendencies were found with other driv-
ers. The tendency to use CE payments for irrigation is lower than since-
preservation investments for direct marketers, farms that expanded, and
those with larger acres preserved—though the opposite was found for those
whose heir is a relative. The tendency to use CE payments for equipment
and buildings is lower for those owning longer, while the tendency to use
CE payments for buildings is lower than typical for farms that expanded.
Collectively, for some farm types, the evidence suggests that CE payments
are not being reinvested with the same tendency as these types of owners
would typically exhibit toward reinvestment. Only those owners who live
on their farm have a greater tendency to use their CE payments towards
equipment reinvestments.
This subsection draws limited comparisons of signs and significance in
light of the unobservability problem. However, additional insight is offered
by a more complete assessment of how first-generation owners used CE pay-
ments for reinvestment relative to their pre-existing tendencies in terms of
ownership, profitability, or other characteristics. Asymmetric tendencies do
not imply that the CE money was not reinvested—the preceding subsection
clarifies the many drivers of CE payments being reinvested. Rather, this sub-
section helps to build a more complete answer about where CE payments
made a critical difference for reinvestment in the agricultural economy.
Alternately, where did CE payments allow an owner to reinvest when that
owner, given his or her characteristics, would have been unlikely to reinvest
otherwise? Despite the unobservability problem, the results as a whole begin
to provide an answer. The model shows that only in four cases did CE pay-
ments increase the tendency that a reinvestment would be made: 1) low-
sales farmers invested CE in irrigation; 2) farms with an heir who is a relative
invested CE in irrigation; 3) owners living on the farm invested CE in equip-
ment; and 4) profitable farms invested in buildings.
Conclusion
This paper used original survey data to investigate exploratory hypothe-
ses about whether land preservation might lead some owners to reinvest in
their agricultural operations. If they do, the theoretical argument offered
herein suggests that CE programs could be having additional, indirect effi-
ciency impacts by allowing farmers to (1) overcome a credit-market failure
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and access their land-appreciation capital, and (2) do so in areas under de-
velopment pressure without having to sell their land to the highest bidder
(preserving positive externalities of agricultural land use). This is a contro-
versial theory, for capital markets ought to be efficient and owners should
be able to access this development increment without having to resort to
CEs. Furthermore, if owners do not reinvest CE payments and used CE for
personal, nonfarming use, then CE programs simply provide a way to ex-
tract capital without using a bank. Such behavior provides the positive ex-
ternality but no indirect efficiency enhancement associated with agricultural
credit, the competition between agricultural and development for land, and
the economies of reinvesting to sustain agriculture.
The data were analyzed to test whether there were systematic patterns in
the use of CE payments. An absence of patterns suggests the data do not
match the theory supported by the exploratory hypotheses—in this case we
could conclude that CE payments and landed capital are costlessly fungible
and there is no evidence of a credit-market failure—for CE payments would
be no more likely than other money (savings or yearly profits) to be re-
invested or extracted. Yet, the analysis found systematic investment patterns
in terms of a farm’s profitability, ownership pattern, and other characteristics.
Unprofitable nonoperators exhibit few systematic patterns of reinvestment or
extraction. Given that these owners tended not to reinvest all else the same,
they probably view all money as fungible. Profitable nonoperators tended to
use CE as a bank, extracting capital for personal use but likely intending to
maintain ownership of this profitable resource. Operators with higher sales
had an increased likelihood of reinvestment. Profitable operators like the non-
operators tended to extract capital. We also used the survey data to examine
if those farmers reinvesting in their operations with CE payments were al-
ready more likely to do so. Although unobservability complicates assessment,
the analysis identified relationships for a few farm characteristics (low-sales
farmers and those with heirs who are relatives invested more on irrigation,
owners living on the farm invested more on equipment, and profitable farms
invested more in buildings) where there was the most evidence that CE pay-
ments increased reinvestment. In sum, the analysis suggests that, for some
owners, CE payments might facilitate reinvestment rather than extracting
capital. In these cases, the evidence suggests that CE payments may indeed
be used to circumvent credit-market failures, creating an indirect efficiency
enhancement. Thus, this paper suggests an important new area of study and
warrants new data collection—possibly using behavioral economics—that
seeks to improve our understanding of why certain types of farmers seek CE
payments and whether CE programs might be redesigned to target those
owners that will trigger the largest efficiency gains, all else being equal.
It must be emphasized that this paper is exploratory; the data collected
cannot overcome unobservability and show under what conditions CE pay-
ments resolve illiquidity. Instead, this paper establishes an evidentiary basis
for future research on illiquidity and CE payments. It is important to note
the analytical tension in the exploratory hypotheses: if data were found that
did not support the hypotheses, then one would conclude that landed cap-
ital is as liquid as CE payments, and thus CE programs have no indirect effi-
ciency impact. This is not shown, and so this paper is suggestive of a new
area of research on landed capital credit-market failures and how farmland
owners can use policy options to circumvent illiquidity and credit-market
failures.
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The results suggest that some farmers are credit constrained and they
might be using CE programs to achieve liquidity. A future study can test
systematically whether farmers’ investment and other choices systematically
change after enrolling (treatment) or not enrolling (control). Such a study
would require data from CE participants and nonparticipants. Based on the
results reported here, this study would also have to control for other options
for seeking credit, develop an innovative control on the fungibility of illi-
quid and liquid assets, measure prior efforts to seek credit and their success,
develop more precise measures of profitability, and develop exact measures
of how much money was allocated to each purpose.
A future study also ought to address a possible limitation of this paper, as
noted by a referee. The theory developed here assumes that CE does not
change farmer wealth; instead, it is a question of accessing the wealth. This
is only true if CEs are valued correctly through an appraisal or program
mechanism and not sold at a discount/premium. Evidence suggests that
preserved farms sell for more than the development-rights appraisal would
suggest, and relatively close to the price of unpreserved farms (see
Nickerson and Lynch 2001; Lynch, Gray, and Geoghegan 2007; Lynch,
Gray, and Geoghegan 2010; Anderson and Weinhold 2008). The absence of
a large diminution in value may arise from residual development options
(Schilling, Sullivan, and Duke 2013). If farm owners use CEs to increase
wealth, then the story about credit constraints might be confounded.
Conversely, farmers may accept a discounted CE payment relative to the
program’s estimated value at the time of the easement to increase the prob-
ability of participating (Horowitz, Lynch and Stocking 2009). Some of this
discounting may reflect owners’ awareness of the true value of their equity.
Alternatively, some farm owners may sell CEs at a large discount under
duress (say, a “fire sale”). In this case, the theory ought to involve timing as
well as liquidity. These issues could be measured and controlled in a future
study.
In addition, the results suggest that additional research could lead to a
more effective preservation policy. One might perceive adverse selection in
that profitable farms are extracting capital. With limited budgets to increase
the externalities retained, it might be better to target farms for preservation
that are on the margins of solvency. Profitable farms are already more
likely to persist in the future even with the threat of urbanization. The CE
payments to these farms might provide positive externalities in
perpetuity—but the opportunity cost is not saving a farm on the margin,
which may then be converted to a non-farm use. The analysis in this paper
supports targeting marginal farms, not only because it may prevent a con-
version but also because they are more likely to reinvest and thus provide
the indirect efficiency result.13 Indeed, the results offer a promising guide
to targeting farms for preservation with observable characteristics. The re-
sults suggest that some farms (such as unprofitable but high sales farms)
are more likely to use CE payments for reinvestment, so CE payments may
13The problem of efficient targeting is complicated by the next-best use. If the marginal farm is simply
run by a below-average manager, then new capital will likely lead to future management below the effi-
cient frontier. However, because of the positive externalities from agricultural land use, this is not neces-
sarily a suboptimal outcome. Optimality depends on whether the farm would be converted to a non-farm
use or it could transition to a better farmer. The CE payments may not deliver the efficiency result if they
prevent transitioning to more profitable farmers.
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actually keep them in business. These funds allow improvements, which in
turn increase the likelihood that they will persist. Beyond efficiency, some
programs may seek to keep the dollars allocated to preservation in the
same jurisdiction. This is more likely to be the case when development-
increment equity is reinvested in value-added activities in the state or loca-
tion funding preservation. Future research may want to assess whether this
happens and whether it has the net effect of lowering the fiscal costs of
preservation.
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Appendix
This appendix summarizes preliminary work to test structural stability in
the model reported in table 6. Pooling the data (i.e., combining first- and
second-generation owners) when modeling imposes the restriction that an
independent variable has the same effect on the dependent variable for both
first- and second-generation owners, but this may not be true. To test
whether the models’ predictors are significantly different for first- and
second-generation owners, we use a Model Likelihood Ratio test. The test
statistic is the Likelihood Ratio chi-square statistic G2 ¼ -2(lp – l1 – l2), where
lp is the maximum of the log-likelihood function for the model on the pooled
data, l1 is the maximum of the log-likelihood function for the model on first-
generation landowners, and l2 is the maximum of the log-likelihood func-
tion for the model on second-generation landowners. In other words, we fit
the same model in each subsample; the unrestricted log likelihood is the
sum of the subsample log likelihoods. Then we pool the subsamples and fit
the model to the pooled sample; the restricted log likelihood is from this
pooled sample. Under the null hypothesis, the statistic G2 has a chi-square
distribution with d.f. ¼ 15 (number of predictors plus 1). See test details
below.
H0: Bt ¼ B for all t> 1 subgroups (in other words, the investment behavior for 1st
and 2nd generation owners is statistically equivalent).
HA: Not all subgroup betas are equal (i.e., there is a structural break, investment
behavior is different for 1st and 2nd generation owners).
We reject the null hypothesis if G2 > X215; :05 ¼ 25.0. The table below shows
LL tests of three investment models. The results show that the models’ coef-
ficients are not statistically different between first- and second-generation
owners.
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-LL2
Investment Model First Generation Second Generation Pooled LL Statistic
Irrigation Model 267.67 72.05 357.72 18.00
Building Model 386.33 88.89 497.13 21.91
Equipment Model 316.26 59.84 397.54 21.44
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